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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n County-to-county mobility drops
significantly when counties are
separated by state borders.
n This drop is not driven by
differences in local characteristics or
in moving costs related to state-level
policy.
n State borders also affect countyto-county social connectedness
(Facebook friendships), suggesting
that personal ties, lack-of-information
friction, or home-state identity might
be at play.
n Counties on state borders that face
this migration stickiness have weaker
recoveries after cyclical downturns,
such as the Great Recession.

T
he United States has traditionally been seen as a highly mobile country, with nearly
one in fve people changing their county of residence every fve years. Even though

internal migration has steadily declined over the past 40 years, the United States still
exhibits higher internal mobility than most European countries (Molloy et al. 2011).
Geographic mobility is ofen viewed as both an opportunity for individuals to fnd better
job opportunities and a mechanism through which places adjust to economic change,
both positive (people move in) and negative (people move out); both channels contribute
to labor market fuidity and economic dynamism (Blanchard and Katz 1992; Molloy et al.
2016).
However, local economic conditions vary considerably across the country. Most
counties are within an hour’s drive of another county that has higher average wages,
lower average house prices, or both. Although there might be other characteristics
that ofset these raw diferences, many individuals could plausibly encounter better
employment or housing opportunities a relatively short distance away, either through
migration or commuting. Factors that reduce or limit this internal migration or
commuting could depress economic growth.
In a related paper, I study a novel aspect of U.S. internal migration and commuting
across counties. Drawing on IRS data on county-to-county migration and census data on
county-to-county commuting, I show that, even conditional on distance, cross-county
migration and commuting drop signifcantly when a state border lies between the two
counties. People are three times as likely to move to a diferent county in the same state—
and about twice as likely to commute to a diferent county in the same state—as to move
to an equally distant county in a diferent state (see Figure 1, next page). In other words,
state borders reduce both residential and employment mobility. Because there are no
legal or residency restrictions associated with state borders (as there are with national
borders), this pattern is perhaps unexpected. Such migration “frictions” could also shape
the way places respond to local economic shocks.

Why State Borders Could Matter

For additional details, see the full working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/358/.

Economists typically model the decision to migrate as a choice between locations
based on the costs and benefts associated with making the move. An individual will
move from County A to County B if the net beneft they get from County B over County
A exceeds the costs of moving there. Tis simple framework suggests three potential
explanations for the drop in mobility at state borders. First, local characteristics that
provide benefts (e.g., good schools or transit options) could discretely change at state
borders, leading to abrupt diferences in the propensity to make such a move. Second,
state policies could impose extra costs on cross-border moves (e.g., occupational
licensing or higher taxes), discouraging people from leaving the state. Finally, the
“connectedness” of counties could fall across state lines. For example, people might be
hesitant to switch to a new state if they have fewer friends or family ties there, or if their
social networks provide less information about circumstances there.
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People are three times
as likely to move to a
diferent county in the
same state as to move to
an equally distant county
in a diferent state.

Local Characteristics Don’t Drive the State Border Mobility Gap
If large diferences in benefts at state borders were behind the mobility gap, we
would expect to see diferences in local characteristics that people care about, such as
economic opportunities, housing afordability, weather, political attitudes, and local
school performance. However, this does not appear to be the case. When I examine the
diference in several characteristics between counties in the same state and counties in an
adjacent state, I do not fnd any sudden jump to have occurred as the distance between
the two groups shrinks. In other words, employment rates, average wages, population,
demographic composition, industry composition, housing prices, weather, voting
patterns, and school outcomes are all similar across state borders. Figure 1 shows that
Figure 1 Panel A: County-to-County Migration Rates
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Figure 1 Panel B: County-to-County Commuting Rates
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NOTE: The circles show migration rates (Panel A) or commuting rates (Panel B) between pairs of counties,
aggregated by distance and whether the pairs are in the same or diferent states. They represent statistical
estimates that have been adjusted for diferences between county characteristics in each, as detailed in
the paper, and thus can be slightly negative. The horizontal axis indicates the distance in miles between
county-pair centers, where centers are population-weighted centroids.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using 2017 IRS SOI county-to-county fows and 2017 LEHD LODES.
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controlling for these characteristics does not afect the migration gap at state borders,
suggesting the drop in mobility there is not driven by diferences in local characteristics.

State Policies Don’t Drive the State Border Mobility Gap
If state policies that caused higher moving costs at state borders were driving the
mobility gap, we would expect patterns to be asymmetric across states. For example,
if diferences in state income taxes played a role, there should be larger state border
migration penalties in moving from low-tax to high-tax states, but smaller migration
penalties (or even bonuses) in the reverse direction. Tis also does not appear to be the
case. Conditional on distance, crossing state borders is associated with a similar drop in
migration regardless of whether the potential destination has higher or lower taxes than
the point of origin. Tis pattern holds not just for taxes (income, sales, or corporate), but
also for the generosity of several state programs and policies (EITC, Medicaid, TANF,
school funding, minimum wage) and the stringency of occupational licensing.

The Role of Social Connectedness
If diferences in local characteristics and state policies don’t drive migration gaps at
state borders, diferences in “social connectedness” across areas might. Drawing upon the
Social Connectedness Index, which measures Facebook friendship rates between pairs
of counties (Bailey et al. 2018), I fnd a similar drop-of in county-to-county friendship
rates at state borders. Conditional on distance, people have about half as many Facebook
friends across state lines as they do in counties within the same state (see Figure 2).
It is challenging to determine causality from this relationship, as social networks
could afect migration but migration could also afect social networks. Nonetheless, the
correlation is consistent with several potential mechanisms. Individuals might face large
psychic costs when moving away from friends and family. If individuals have fewer friends
across state borders, psychic costs would be larger for moves that cross state lines. Having
fewer social connections across the state border could also impede the fow of information,
leading to more uncertainty and reducing people’s willingness to change states.
Figure 2 County-to-County Facebook Friendship Rates Also Drop Of at State
Borders, Even When Distances Are Small

Scaled FB Friends per 1,000 people

Mobility drops at state
borders, even when
controlling for detailed
local characteristics of
origin and destination
counties.
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NOTE: The circles show the number of Facebook friends per 1,000 residents, as measured in the Social
Connectedness Index, between pairs of counties, aggregated by distance and whether the pairs are in the
same or diferent states. The number of Facebook friends has been scaled to protect privacy, so values can
fall below 0. See note to Figure 1.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using 2016 Social Connectedness Index (Bailey et al. 2018).
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Conditional on distance,
people have about half as
many Facebook friends
across state lines as they
do in counties within the
same state.

A third factor that infuences both cross-border social connectedness and mobility
could also be at play. People might exhibit a behavioral quirk known as the endowment
efect, in which it is especially costly to give up things one is initially “endowed” with.
What would this look like in the migration decision? Tis might show up as a home
state identity. People identify with the state that they were born in or grew up in, and it is
thus costly for them to consider moving away. Unfortunately, few data sources allow the
exploration of this type of mechanism. However, there are several pieces of suggestive
evidence. When looking at the American Community Survey, an annual survey of more
than one million U.S. households, movers who were living in their state of birth are less
than half as likely to move out of state as movers who were already living outside their
birth state. Using data from a small survey on mobility conducted by the Pew Research
Center in 2008, I fnd that 68 percent of respondents say that they live in their birth state
because “they feel like they belong [there]” or because their birth state is the place they
most identify with. A large share of people thus exhibit a birth-state identity, and in the
survey these individuals were less likely to have ever moved out of state. Interestingly,
when asked hypothetical questions about moving, individuals who exhibit a birth-state
identity are less likely to report willingness to move only if they are currently living in
their birth state. Tis is consistent with an endowment efect, making it costly to move
away from one’s state of birth.

Policy Implications: Does This Pattern in Mobility Matter for Labor Markets?
Regardless of why state borders afect mobility, understanding how this pattern
infuences labor markets has important policy implications. Recent research fnds that
places that experienced larger downturns during the Great Recession took longer to
recover economically and fell behind less afected areas, even years later (Hershbein and
Stuart 2020). Building on this work, I test to see whether this pattern difers for counties
at state borders (where this mobility “friction” is likely more binding) relative to counties
in the interior of the state (see Figure 3). I fnd that the pattern is stronger in border
Figure 3 Employment Recovery after the Great Recession Also Lags at State Borders
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NOTE: The estimates show the year-by-year (approximate) impact of a 1 percent greater decrease in
commuting-zone employment between 2007 and 2009 on the percentage change in employment in other
years, separately for counties on state borders and those in the interior of the state.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.
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Previous research
has found that local
areas sufering greater
employment losses
during a recession are
slow to recover, and I fnd
that this pattern is even
stronger in counties along
state borders than in
interior counties.
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counties, where recoveries from employment losses occur even more slowly. Consistent
with the mobility pattern, border counties also see lower in-migration and in-commuting
during the recovery period, potentially limiting the dynamism of these local economies.
Tese patterns in turn may help us better understand the variation in economic success
and growth across areas of the United States and highlight why some places are slow
to bounce back from economic downturns. Tey also are relevant for the evaluation of
social safety-net and place-based policies, as migration frictions can afect who stays,
who comes in, and how both afect the recovery path from a local recession.
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